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Governance risks stem from the own governance of any organization. The paper puts 
forward  an  operational  viewpoint  of  those  risks,  by  mapping  the  most  distinctive 
categories  of  governance  analysis  onto  time-dependent  governance  variables. 
Afterwards, risks conveyed by the latter are measured against incremental cash flows. 
The procedure allows a joint analysis of the risky positions carried out by governance 
variables, tracking them down onto their natural drivers, the incremental cash flows 
related  to  assets,  creditors,  managers,  stockholders,  and  the  company’s  portfolio  of 
non-current financial assets  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In this paper, I will set forth what governance risks are about and expand on how to 
handle them by means of the incremental cash-flow model. Primary antecedents of the 
new technique can be found in earlier research papers of mine
2.  
 
Section 1 will focus on how the concept of risk applies in Corporate Finance, whereby we 
could take a further step intended to frame an operational definition of governance risks 
in section 2. While section 3 brings forth the foundations for the incremental cash-flow 
model, it is for section 4 to show how governance risks can be weighed up from the 
perspective  of  such  model.  Lastly,  a  comprehensive  numerical  application  of  the 
technique will be developed in full. 
 
1   ABOUT RISKS IN CORPORATE FINANCE 
 
Firstly, let us assume that we are planning along a time-framed horizon H = [t ; T], 
starting at date “t” and ending at date “T”. Next, we choose a temporal variable that we 
want to study
3 
X( s ) 
 
For instance, X(s) could refer to the rate of return from a financial asset, or perhaps its 
price in the market at date s.  
 
                                                 
2 Apreda (1999a, 1999b, 2002a, 2004, 2008). 
3 Although it is currently called “variable”, X is actually a function whose domain lies on the set of real 
numbers, and the same holds for its co-domain, hence: 
 
X :  R 
1  ® ® ® ® R 
1     ;       such that     H =  [ t; T ]  Í Í Í Í   R 
1  
 
Any value s less than t signals a past event with respect to date t, whereas any value of s greater than t 
stands for a future event.    4
Afterwards, we need to elicit the value of X(T) at the onset of the horizon. That is to say, 
we engage in the appraisal of  E [X( T );  I( t )], an expression  that reads “the expected 
value of X at T, retrieved from the information set I(t) available to the analyst at date t”.  
 
Broadly  speaking,  by  an  information  set  I(t)  it  is  usually  understood  all  the  stored 
information up to that date stemming from manifold sources, namely the analyst own 
experience and professional qualifications
4, including any attainable public information, 
also outside expert information to be tapped into, and the like
5.  Following this line of 
argument, two separate valuation dates must be confronted, and for each of them the 
underlying information sets will be different most of the time. 
 
t   
(valuation date) 
T 
(end of the planning horizon) 
 
E[ X( T ) ] 
the value that is assessed at the  
beginning of the horizon  
 
 
X( T ) 
the value that is realized at the end  
of the horizon 
 
The analyst makes his decisions constrained by his 
information set I(t). 
 
The analyst hence adds to the old information set 
I(t) new information brought about by unexpected 
events along the horizon, finally getting I(T). 
 
Hardly  surprising,  there  will  be  a  discrepancy  between  the  expected  value  and  the 
realized one, an event whose occurrence marks out what is meant by risk in Finance.   
 
Definition 1    Risk in Finance 
 
Along any planning horizon H = [t ; T], risk in finance arises out of the discrepancy  
 
∆ X(t ; T) 
                                                 
4 Including knowledge, which comprises not only information, but also learning about how to use it. On 
this topic, the book Knowledge Sets by Doignon and Falmagne (1999) gives an innovative and remarkable 
mathematical background.     
5 Further development on this issue can be found in Apreda (2002a). 
   5
between the expected and realized values of any financial variable X. That is to say, 
 
∆ X(t ; T )   =    X( T )   - - - -    E[ X( T ); I( t ) ]      
 
From now on, the discrepancy ∆X(t ; T) will also be called “risk-gap” 
 
Remarks 
￿  In  contradistinction  to  risky  assets,  whose  ex  ante  and  ex  post  returns  point  out  to  natural 
discrepancies, a risk-free asset F is predicated on condition that expected and realized returns 
fulfill  
R( F, T )  =  E[ R( F, T ) ; I( t ) ] 
 
￿  Definitions, within the scope of this paper, stand for a semantic and methodological vehicle on 
behalf of any considered reader who may ask himself: which is the meaning the author attaches to 
such and such expression? Under no circumstances definitions will intend to be regarded as the 
best available, still less the only ones that may be adopted 
 
1.1   DOWNSIDE AND UPSIDE RISKS 
 
Whenever we buy a financial asset at date t, it is said that we “open a risk-position” 
because at the closing date T when the asset is sold
6, the actual selling value will be at 
variance with the one forecasted at the opening date.  
 
Example 
Let us imagine that an analyst or investor buys at date t a financial asset issued by 
company K. At that moment, he assesses a yield of 7% to be reaped at the end of the 
planning horizon (for instance, six months ahead). At date T, however there will be a 
discrepancy  between  expected  and  realized  values.  For  the  sake  of  illustration,  two 
possible states of nature will be discussed: 
 
                                                 
6 Instead of selling the asset, we could rebalance the portfolio and choose T as a the starting date of a new 
horizon, H = [ T ; T + h ]. To all intents and purposes, if we kept the asset along the new horizon, we 
would have to forecast the expected return E[ R ( T + h ) ; I( T ) ].    6
State 1:   the realized return climbed to 9 %. 
State 2:  the realized return fell down to 6%. 
 
When closing the risk-position, it is said that we have run an upside risk whenever the 
expected value performs worse than the realized value. If such were not the case, and the 
realized value had fallen down below the expected value, we would have run a downside 
risk.  In  both  states,  opening  a  risk-position  eventually  leads  either  to  beneficial  or 
detrimental consequences. However, when assessing the side effects of any position we 
must wonder how much of the value in the final stage of the open position should be 
attributable to the budgeter skills, and to what extent a cluster of factors foreign to him 
might have been shaping that outcome eventually. Next box brings home these matters, 
taking advantage of the foregoing example.  
  
 
Risk Position  
  
Opening position at valuation date t  Closing position at date T 
 
E[ R k (t ; T) ]   =   7% 
 
 
State 1                R k (t ; T)  =  9% 











+  2% 
 
-  1% 
 
Good for the analyst 
(what about unexpected events outside the analyst’s reach?) 
Bad for the analyst 
(what about unexpected events outside the analyst’s reach?)  
 
 
Performance of the Risk Position  
 





+  2% 
-  1% 
 
Upside risk. The opening position was beneficial. 




From  the  viewpoint  of  this  after-the-fact  analysis,  there  would  be  four  types  of 
overlapping consequences involved in currently decision-making processes:   7
￿  intended outcomes that follow from profit-seeking and forecasting techniques, 
￿  unintended results that stem from sheer mistakes, incompetence, or negligence, 
￿  unintended consequences arising out of external factors to the analyst, 
￿  and, last but not least, the learning from the discrepancy between expected and 
realized values of the variable provides feedback to upgrade future assessments. 
 
2.  GOVERNANCE RISKS 
 
To begin with, any organization comprises a governance structure that hinges upon two 
main pillars: regulatory and discretionary blueprints of governance
7. On the other hand, 
corporate governance can be defined
8 as that field of learning and practice concerned 
with the following problems and issues, which may be labeled “governance categories of 
analysis”: 
 
▪  Ownership structure and owners rights. 
▪  Company’s founding Charter and by-laws. 
▪  The  Board  of  Directors  or  Trustees;  their  fiduciary  duties  and  the  allocation  of 
control rights.  
▪  Accountability and transparency. 
▪  Managers’ fiduciary duties and their decision rights; performance and incentives. 
▪  Investors’ property rights and protective covenants 
▪  Conflicts of interest among owners, directors, managers, creditors, and with other 
stakeholders.  
▪  Rent-seeking, soft-budget constraints, and tunneling. 
▪  Institutional constraints, the role of regulators and gatekeepers, compliance. 
 
Be that as it may, merely itemizing governance categories does not warrant that we can 
measure governance risks, unless we were able to map those categories onto distinctive 
decision-making variables like the ones listed in the box below
9.  
 
                                                 
7 In other words, the governance that is compulsorily requested by law and regulators, in contrast with the 
governance any organization can improve by option and will. 
8 The definition comes out of the semantics of governance as it was unfolded in Apreda (2005). 
9 Like any other of the sort, classifications remain a matter of choice. Therefore, the mapping suggested in 
the box does not intend to be the only one available, nor the best among other candidates.   8
The salient difference between governance categories and variables for decision-making 
can be stated the following way: the former contributes to the understanding and analysis 
of the main components of corporate governance as a field of enquiry, the latter moves on 
to the practical and factual sides of corporate governance.  
 
 




 of analysis 
 
 
Governance variables G k ( s ) for decision-making 
along  the planning horizon  H  =  [ t ; T ] 
 
ownership structure  
owners rights 
G1  ( s )   =  Owners ( s )      
 
the board of directors or trustees 
their fiduciary duties  
the allocation of their control rights 
G2  ( s )   =  Directors ( s )    
managers’ fiduciary duties  
their decision rights 
their performance and incentives 
G3  ( s )   =  Managers ( s )  
creditors’ property rights  
protective covenants 
G4  ( s )   =  Creditors ( s )   
the company’s founding charter 
internally enacted by-laws 
accountability 
transparency 
G5  ( s )   =  Governance architecture ( s ) 
conflicts of interest 
a) among owners, directors, managers,  
and creditors 
b) with other stakeholders 




G7  ( s )   =  Deviant governance ( s ) 
institutional constraints 
the role of regulators and gatekeepers  
compliance 
G8  ( s )   =  Overlooking and compliance ( s ) 
 
It’s worth remarking that the foregoing arrangement of governance variables can be split 
into two distinctive groups: 
 
a)  variables pertaining to governance actors 
 
￿  Owners ( s )  
￿  Directors ( s )      
￿  Managers ( s )  
￿  Creditors ( s )   
   9
b)  variables bringing about material consequences for the organization 
 
￿  Governance architecture ( s ) 
￿  Conflicts of interest ( s )  
￿  Deviant governance ( s ) 
￿  Overlooking and compliance ( s ) 
 
If we take into account the argument developed in section 1.1 around the issue of risk in 
Finance
10, we will realize that governance variables are time-dependent and make for 
risk-positions, and both features call for a streamlined definition.  
 
Definition 2     Governance Risks 
 
In the planning horizon H = [ t ; T ], by Governance Risks we mean those risks that arise 
out of the following time-dependant governance variables of analysis, namely 
 
￿  Owners ( s ) 
￿  Directors ( s )      
￿  Managers ( s )  
￿  Creditors ( s )   
￿  Governance architecture ( s ) 
￿  Conflicts of interest ( s )  
￿  Deviant governance ( s ) 
￿  Overlooking and compliance ( s ) 
 
Definition 2 brings forth a comprehensive set of time-dependent governance variables
11 
 
{ G k ( s )  :  k = 1, 2, ….., 8 ;  s Î Î Î Î R
1 } 
                                                 
10 This suits what Oliver Williamson noticed in his book “The Mechanisms of Governance”, chapter 7, pp. 
171  (1996),  and  his  1998  paper  (p.  567):  both  corporate  governance  and  corporate  finance  can  be 
assimilated to the sides of a same coin. 
11 It will be read like “the set of the governance variables G k ( s ), where k is an index that takes values 
from 1 to 8, and s is any real number in the line of time.” See also footnote 2.     10
from which it can be established the risk-gap D D D D (Gk, t, T) between the assessed value at 
date t and the realized value at date T, for each governance variable. That is to say: 
(1)  
D D D D (G k , t , T )   =   G k (T)   - - - -   E[ G k (T); I(t) ] 
 
The task ahead consists in finding out how to measure the risks encompassed by (1). To 
achieve a suitable metrics for them, I will be putting forward an innovative technique
12 
that works out governance risks by means of their impact through incremental cash flows. 
But  before  dealing  with  the  linkage  between  incremental  cash  flows  and  governance 
variables, let us underline the basics of the incremental cash flow model. 
 
3.  THE INCREMENTAL CASH-FLOW MODEL 
 
How  is  the  so-called  incremental  cash-flow  model
13 built  up  eventually?  Firstly,  a 
planning horizon H = [ t ; T ] will be defined and, secondly, the analyst must be provided 
with a Balance Sheet at t, the closest as possible to such date, perhaps by updating the 
last reported statement. He will also avail himself of an Income Statement budgeted from 
date t through date T, and a projection of the Balance Sheet up to date T.   
 
 
Balance Sheet at the beginning and end of the planning horizon 
 




(net of depreciations and  
amortizations) 





   
 
Total assets 
     
Liabilities  +  Equity  
   
 
 
                                                 
12 This sort of metrics was dealt with for the first time in Apreda (1999a, 1999b). An alternative technique 
based on a weighted average index of governance can be found in Apreda (2007). 
13 Ross et al. (1995, chapter 2) renders a a standard reference.   11
Thereafter, he shifts current liabilities to the left side of the preceding information box, 
placing  them  into  the  working  capital,  which  is  a  net  balance  of  current  assets  and 
liabilities.  
 









[ t ; T ] 
 
D D D D  Working capital  
D D D D  Non-current assets (net of 
depreciations and amortizations) 
 
   
D D D D  Non-current liabilities 
D D D D  Equity 
 
 
The rationale for these changes lies on the analyst’s need of dealing with incremental 
cash flows, that is to say, those cash flows that come to existence and are explained by 
events that only take place along the planning horizon.  
 
But  there  is  still  another  reason  for  this  course  of  action.  The  realocation  of  current 
liabilities will keep them apart from medium- and long-term liabilities, which is a prime 
target when valuing investment decisions over a multi-periodic horizon.  
 
Therefore, the right side of the incremental balance exhibits the mid- and long-termed 
sources  of  finance,  namely  banks,  institutional  investors,  bondholders,  and  equity 
holders
14. In contrast, the left side of the information box above compehends operating 
assets and liabilities on the one hand, and non-current assets on the other (mainly fixed 
and  intangible,  but  also  financial  assets  issued  by  other  companies,  governments,  or 
banks).  
  
Once the incremental balance has been rounded off, the analyst will resort to a simplified 
Income Statement, as shown below. 
 
                                                 
14 Under this label we include holders of ordinary or preferred stock when the organization is a corporation. 
For another sort of organizations, we would be speaking about partners, beneficiaries, owners, and the like.     12
 
 
COMPACT INCOME STATEMENT 
 
Concept  Remarks 
 
Ordinary and extraordinary income 
minus all-inclusive costs 
minus depreciation and amortization charges 
 
EBIT (earnings before interest on  
non-current liabilities and taxes) 
 
minus interest on non-current liabilities 





1.- Depreciation and amortization are charges that 
reflect the consumption of fixed assets and 
intangibles. They become tax-deductible, 
although not being actual cash outlays. 
 
2.- Interest on current liabilities are disclosed 
above the EBIT line, as operating costs.  
 
3.- Interest on non-current liabilities are disclosed 
below the EBIT line, to take advantage of tax 
deduction. They will become a key component 
among the cash flows addressed to creditors.  
Net income allocation  
￿  to dividends 
￿  to retained earnings   
 
 
Next, we move onto a distinctive construct for the assessment of economic value creation, 
a procedure grounded on the following assumptions:  
 
a)  EBIT turns out by subtracting cost charges from income sources. Hence, it is a 
residual category that amounts to cash flows available to the company.  
b)  As  regards  interest  on  non-current  liabilities,  the  analyst  subtracts  them  from 
EBIT before figuring out taxes. 
c)  On the other hand, depreciation and amortizations are not cash outlays albeit they 
have been disclosed like another cost so as to profit from the tax shelter
15. Hence, 
this money is brought back to the pool of available cash flows. 
d)  Accordingly, we arrive at a new cash-flow residual   
 
EBIT   - - - -   taxes    +   depreciation   +   amortization 
 
                                                 
15 The charge also reflects, it goes without saying, the “consumption” of the fixed asset as time passes by.   13
that is called “operating cash flow”
16 but which cannot be regarded as a proxy of 
value creation yet: for instance, we have to make provisions for the management 
of working capital along the horizon. 
e)  By the same token, we also need to set aside provisions for non-current assets, 
embracing  the  main  components  of  this  cash-flow  construct:  fixed  assets, 
intangibles,  and,  extremely  relevant  indeed,  non-current  financial  assets 
purchased  by  the  company  to  hoard  securities  as  a  cushion  for  future  growth 
opportunities  or  to  meet  contractual  liabilities  on  their  due  date  at  further 
maturities. 
f)  In  the  end,  we  attain  an  ultimate  residual  free  of  costs  and  provisions,  which 
renders  the  expected  value  creation  of  the  company.  It  is  usually  denoted 
“incremental cash flows generated by assets”. 
 
 
Incremental cash flows generated by assets 
D D D D CF(from assets) 




plus depreciation and amortization charges  
 
residual income, assumption a) 
assumption b) 
assumption c)  
 
D D D D CF(operating cash flows) 
minus provisions for working capital  
minus provisions for non-current assets 
 









After  bringing  about  the  incremental  cash  flows  from  assets,  the  analyst  proceeds  to 
apportion this residual between creditors and stockholders. 
 
 
                                                 
16 It must be noticed that we have not subtracted interest on non-current liabilities from operating cash 
flows because the former will be allocated into the composite of cash flows delivered to creditors.  
 
 
   14
i.  Cash flows addressed to creditors 
 
This is a compound of four cash flows delivered to or received from creditors
17: 
 
Interest payments   they can be regarded as cash flows handed out to creditors 
Principal payments  they are also cash flows to creditors 
Debt repurchase  the company can repay a bank loan in advance, or repurchase standing 
bonds before their maturity date, hence sending money to creditors. 
New debt  to  be  issued  within  the  planning  horizon,  by  which  creditors  lend 
money to the company. 
 
In this way, cash flows to creditors arise out of the following structure: 
 
D D D D CF(to creditors)  =  interest   +  principal  +  debt repurchase  - - - -  new debt 
 
ii.  Cash flows addressed to stockholders 
 
In the case of stockholders, the company will give cash flows out to them under the guise 
of  dividends  or  stock  repurchase,  whereas  it  will  receive  money  out  of  new  stock 
placements. In other words,   
 
D D D D CF(to stockholders)  =  dividends   +  stock repurchase  - - - -  new stock 
 
After the distribution has been wholly accomplished, the incremental cash-flow model 
makes its way as a matter of course. 
 
Definition 3  Incremental cash-flow model 
 
For any planning horizon H = [ t ; T ], by the incremental cash-flow model is meant that 
the following relationship among incremental cash flows holds true 
 
                                                 
17 Corporate Finance practitioners take an opposite convention to the one followed by either the Treasurer 
or the Accountant in the company: cash outflows to creditors will carry a positive while inflows from 
creditors a negative sign. To all intents and purposes, the positive sign conveys the meaning that we are 
distributing cash flows from assets.   15
 D D D D CF(from assets)    =    D D D D CF(to creditors)    +    D D D D CF(to stockholders) 
 
Next  section  will  set  forth  the  connection  between  variables  of  governance  and 
incremental cash flows. Before doing that, however, the incremental cash-flow model has 
to be enlarged so as to include not only creditors and stockholders, but also two other 
blocks of cash flows at the root of governance risks, namely 
 
￿  cash flows routed to managers and directors, primarily lodged above the EBIT 
line and charged as forthcoming expenses; 
 
￿  cash  flows  allocated  to  provisions  for  non-current  assets  under  the  label  of 
financial non-current assets and below the line of cash flows from operations. 
 
We are going to draw both of them out of D D D D CF(from assets), where they are affected 
with a minus sign, and add them up on the right side of the incremental model. Therefore, 
we get: 
(2) 
D D D D CF(from assets; net)    =    D D D D CF(to creditors)    +    D D D D CF(to stockholders) 
 
+    D D D D CF(to managers and directors)    +    D D D D CF(non-current financial assets) 
 
It can be noticed in (2) that cash flows from assets will remain netted since we have taken 
away from it not only cash flows tied to managers and directors, but also those intended 
for the setting up of the company’s investment portfolio.   
  
4.    MEASURING GOVERNANCE RISKS  
AGAINST INCREMENTAL CASH FLOWS 
 
In section 2, we pointed that governance variables encompass those primarily linked to 
governance actors on the one side, and those that entail consequences for the governance 
structure on the other.    16
Let us draft a matrix of eight rows attached to the governance variables and five columns 
that stand in for the cash flows displayed by (2), that is to say, the enlarged frame of the 
incremental  cash-flow  model.  In short, each cell in the matrix is the junction of one 
governance variable with one type of incremental cash flow.    
 
 
MATRIX OF SENSITIVITIES BETWEEN 
GOVERNANCE VARIABLES AND INCREMENTAL CASH FLOWS 
 
  D D D D CF 
(assets, net) 
 
D D D DCF 
(creditors) 
 
D D D D CF 
(stockholders) 
 









G 1 ( s )   =  stockholders (t) 
         
 
G 2 ( s )   =  directors (t) 
         
 
G 3 ( s )   =   managers (t) 
        governance 
risk  
 
G 4 ( s )   =  creditors (t) 
         
G 5 ( s )   =  governance 
architecture 
         
 
G 6 ( s )   =  conflicts of interest 
        governance 
risk  
 
G 7 ( s )   =  deviant governance 
        governance 
risk  
G 8 ( s )   =  overlooking and 
compliance 




When the third row of  the matrix meets the fifth column, at least three facts can be 
asserted: 
a)  G3 is a time-scaled governance variable involved with the fiduciary duties and 
decision  rights  on  behalf  of  managers,  as  well  as  their  performance  and 
incentives.   
b)  D D D D CF(non-current financial assets) refer to cash flows over which managers 
and directors bring into play a wide range of discretionary power. They shift 
cash from idle balances and invest it in financial assets issued by companies, 
governments or banks, all of them with medium- or long-term maturities. 
c)  Decision-making  related  to  G3  shapes  the  actual  amount  of  cash  flows 
allocated to non-current financial assets. That is why the sensitivity of these 
cash  flows  to  G3  is  marked,  in  the  matrix  above,  with  the  expression 
“governance risk”.       17
Afterwards,  we  should  look  into  the  relationship  between  G6 ,  a  variable  conveying 
conflicts of interests, with the same column as before. In this cell, some features stand 
out. 
d)  Managers that intend to keep a rising stock of non-current financial assets 
may signal their entrenchment with heavy balances of liquid assets, whereas 
stockholders would have preferred to undertake riskier investment projects, or 
be handed out more dividends. 
e)  It also can tell us that the Board may be committed to build up available 
money to repurchase debt or stock, against the course advised by managers to 
apportion those cash balances in new growth opportunities.  
  
Let  us  move  on  to  the  cell  where  G7 comes  across  the  same  column  of  non-current 
financial assets. In this case, we can also draw some inferences: 
f)  The scope of G7 is not only broad but also pervasive; it actually comprises 
manifold varieties of deviant behavior among which we can highlight rent-
seeking, soft-budget constraints, and tunneling. 
g)  On the other hand, and as we saw in b) above, the main characteristic of 
D D D DCF(non-current  financial  assets)  is  that  of  being  under  the  managers’  
primary control. 
h)  Whereas a heavy allocation of money to this block of cash flows might be 
explained away by well-grounded reasons (hoarding, investment, stocking up 
resources for future outlays), a deviant usage of non-current financial assets 
may convey a hidden agenda for rent-seeking and soft-budget constraints: by 
setting apart money to pay managers lavish compensation packages, or by 
incurring  in  what  is  denoted  “agency  consumption”  (new  buildings  and 
luxurious  offices;  vehicles,  travel  and  hotel  disgraceful  expenses;  buying 
corporate  jets  or  ships;  designing  perk  benefits  for  the  enjoyment  of 
managers, directors, even big stockholders
18). 
      
                                                 
18 Bebchuk and Fried (2003) stress two further developments on this problem: the outrage effect, and the 
camouflage device.   18
Lastly, we can also discuss what happens when the variable of governance G 8 interacts 
with D D D DCF(non-current financial assets): 
i)  If the allocation of cash flows to non-current  assets cannot adequately be 
explained then regulators or gatekeepers could suspect foul play on the side of 
managers and directors, who could be blamed for likely misdoing or lack of 
compliance with rules and good practices. 
 
Summing up, cash flows committed to non-current financial assets as the matrix above 
shows forth, are highly sensitive to governance variables related to managers, conflicts 
of interest, deviant behavior, overlooking and compliance.  
 
5.  APPLICATION:  HOW TO MEASURE GOVERNANCE RISKS  
BY MEANS OF THE INCREMENTAL CASH-FLOW MODEL 
 
A detailed practice follows to illustrate how governance risks can be appraised with the 
help of the incremental cash-flow model. For the sake of clarity, it will be unfolded into 
stages. Two reports will be included; a first one devoted to find out the weakest points in 
the assessment of incremental cash flows at date t that could trigger off governance risks 
along the horizon. The second will measure governance risks when we reach date T, by 
drawing up an after-the-fact contrast between assessed and realized values.  
 
Stage 1.-   The  Setting  
Let us assume that the Board of Directors of a non-financial company requests the CFO 
to produce a statement of incremental cash flows to be assessed at the onset of a planning 
horizon H = [ t; T ] that spans a year ahead.   
 
Stage 2.-   The choice of information inputs 
It will be for the CFO to work out the required statement by means of a balance sheet 
updated to the closest date before t, a budgeted Income Statement, and the estimated 
balance sheet for date T. Afterwards, he will fill in three working sheets to extrapolate 
cash flows from assets, to creditors, and to stockholders.   19
  
 
Balance Sheet at date t, and expected balance sheet at date T (in millions) 
Concept  t    T  Concept  t  T 
Current  assets  100  120  Current liabilities   80           100 
Non-current assets 
(net of depreciation and 
amortizations) 






















Expected  Income Statement over the planning horizon (in millions) 
Income                 2,938 
minus costs              2,100 
minus depreciation fixed assets                   100            
Ebit (earnings before interest on non-current liabilities and taxes)     738   
minus interest on non-current liabilities                  60 
Ebit (after interest on non-current liabilities)                678 
Taxes [ 35% out of Ebit (after interest) ]                 237       
Net Income                  441     
Expected Net Income allocation (in millions) 
To dividends      200 
To retained earnings    241 
 
Stage 3.-   Drawing up the incremental cash-flow model  
       contingent on the information set I( t ). 
 




Worksheet 1: Cash flows from assets 





D D D D CF(operating cash flows) 
minus provisions for working capital 














Additional information on working capital 









working capital increment   20  - 20  0 
Provisions for working capital   0 
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Additional information on non-current assets 
Concept  Date t  Date T  Increment 
Non-current assets  







Non-current financial investment   200  300  100 
Non-current fixed assets (gross)  
Retained depreciation  










Provisions for non-current assets  
(the balance sheet nets out at 100, whereas provisions take into account the depreciation)  
200 
 
b) Worksheet 2 
 
 
Worksheet 2: Cash flows to creditors 
Incremental cash flow  Value 
Interest 
plus debt principal 
plus debt repurchase 










Addtional information for creditors 
Concept  Date t  Date T  Increment 
Non-current liabilities (from the balance sheet)    300  300  0 
Remarks 
a)  debt with banks 
 principal                          50 
        debt repurchase               50 
 new debt with banks     100 
 
b)  debt with bondholders 
        principal                                  100 
        debt repurchase                       100 
        new debt with bondholders     200 
 
c) Worksheet 3 
 
 
Worksheet 3: Cash flows to stockholders 
Incremental cash flow   Value 
Dividends 
plus repurchase of stock 









Additional information for stockholders 
Concept  Date t  Date T  Increment 
Equity  







Source of equity changes: 
a)  new stock                         154  
  
 
b)  repurchase of stock                  295 
c)  retained earnings                      241 
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From worksheets 1 through 3 we must verify that the incremental cash floor equation 
holds.  
D D D D CF(from assets)    =  401  
 
D D D D CF(to creditors)    +    D D D D CF(to stockholders)     =    60   +  341    =    401 
 
Stage 4.- Governance Risks Report at date t  [contingent on the information set I(t) ] 
 
The report will focus on three issues:  
a)  how do cash flows from assets get actually distributed? 
b)  how much do creditors and stockholders receive at last? 
c)  what sort of preliminary conclusions should be derived eventually? 
 
Cash flows from assets and primary distribution 
 
The expected value creation appraised by the analyst amounts to   
 
D CF(from assets)    =    401 
 
How does the company intend to distribute them? It goes without saying that contractual 
liabilities come first: 
 
interest   +   principal    =    60  +   150    =    210 
 
As we see, they could be paid outright from cash flows from assets.   
 
Secondly, we see that the Board decided to distribute dividends that can also be funded 
with cash flows from assets,  
dividends  =   200 
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Cash flows to creditors and stockholders 
 
If we now turned to new debt and stock provisions, they would paint a misleading picture: 
 
new debt   +   new stock    =   300   +   154    =    454 
 
What would be the underlying target of such issuance? The most comforting answer 
would point to a new investment. Notice that assessed provisions to non-current assets 
can be split down into the following charges: 
 
Non-current financial assets    100 
Fixed assets         100 
 
Hence, the new financing does not meet any sensible investment target, whereby the 
focus of inquiry should be shifted towards cash-flow blocks linked with creditors and 
stockholders, namely 
 
debt repurchase   +   stock repurchase    =    150   +    295    =    445 
 
Does it seem plausible that the company requests money from creditors and stockholders 
to engineer a comprehensive repurchase operation. If this were the case, some thorny 
questions would arise: 
 
a)  does the company attempt to finance this operation on considered judgements? 
b)  or does the company resort to this mechanism because is contriving a deviant 
behavior like rent-seeking and soft budget constraints? 
 
To  play  on  the  safest  side,  the  company  should  hedge  this  substantial  repurchase 
operation with cash flows from assets. But for doing that, the latter should be topped out 
at 846 instead of 401. This is not the case, however. Hence, either the senior management 
or the board is liable to explain the rationale of taking such a huge level of debt and new   23
stock. Otherwise, they could be purposefully misrepresenting the facts for the achieving 
of underhand dealings, namely 
 
a)  repurchasing debt to take advantage of lower bond prices, washing out liabilities 
of  the  balance  sheet  as  well  as  interest  payments  in  forthcoming  income 
statements; 
b)  repurchasing  stock  to  get  rid  of  troublesome  shareholder’s  minorities,  or  to 
remove the company from being listed in certain stock exchange; 
c)  requesting new investors to help the company reshape the quality and sources of 
old finance without starting a countervailing investment project.  
 
Preliminary conclusions 
i)  There are governance risks that come out of decisions regarding cash flows to 
creditors and stockholders, mainly around new finance. 
ii)  The board and senior management should explain about practices that foster 
governance risks. 
iii)  It seems advisable to go through what is going to happen at date T. 
 
5.- Risk position analysis between the expected and realized cash flows at date T 
 
 
Expected Balance Sheet at date t and realized Balance Sheet at date T (in millions) 
Concept  T  T  Concept  T  T 
Current  assets  100  120  Current liabilities   80           200 
Non-current assets 
(net of depreciation and 
amortizations) 






















Income Statement (in millions) 
Income                  2,900 
minus costs                1,900 
minus depreciation fixed assets                   100            
Ebit (earnings before interest on non-current liabilities and taxes)       900   
minus interest on non-current liabilities                    60 
Ebit (after interest on non-current liabilities)                     840 
Taxes [ 35% out of Ebit (after interest) ]                294       
Net Income                      546     
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Net Income allocation (in millions) 
To dividends      400 
To retained earnings    146 
   
a) Worksheet 1 
 
 
Worksheet 1: Cash flows from assets 





D D D D CF(operating cash flows) 
minus provisions for working capital 













Additional information on working capital 









working capital increment       -100 
Provisions for working capital   -100 
 
Additional information on non-current assets 
Concept  Date t  Date T  Increment 
Non-current assets  
(from the balance sheet) 
900  1,500  600 
Non-current financial investment   200  700  500 
Non-current fixed assets (gross)  
Retained depreciation  










Provisions for non-current assets  




b) Worksheet 2 
 
 
Worksheet 2: Cash flows to creditors 
Incremental cash flow  Value 
Interest 
plus debt principal 
plus debt repurchase 
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Addtional information for creditors 
Concept  Date t  Date T  Increment 
 
Non-current liabilities 








a)  debt with banks 
        principal                             50 
               debt repurchase                  50 
               new debt with banks        100 
 
b)  debt with bondholders 
               principal                                       100 
               debt repurchase                            100 
               new debt with bondholders          600  
 
c) Worksheet 3 
 
 
Worksheet 3: Cash flows to stockholders 
Incremental cash flow   Value 
Dividends 
plus repurchase of stock 









Additional information for stockholders 
Concept  Date t  Date T  Increment 
Equity  







Source of equity changes: 
a)  new stock                     154  
b)  repurchase of stock            200 
c)  retained earnings                146  
 
 
Stage 6.- Governance Risks Report at date T  [contingent on the information set I(T) ] 
 
In contrast with the report developed in stage 4, this one will carry out a comprehensive 
analysis of governance risks shown forth by the incremental cash flow model.  The risk 
position was open at date t and was brought into completion at date T. 
  
The report will check out the following features: 
a)  how have cash flows from assets been distributed? 
b)  what can be said about the ultimate application of cash flows to creditors and 
stockholders? 
c)  critical analysis of the risk position 
d)  final conclusions 
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Cash flows from assets and primary distribution 
 
The first step consists in comparing the ex ante and the ex post valuations. 
 
Ex ante      D CF(from assets)    =    401 
Ex post      D CF(from assets)    =    106 
     
Almost every ex ante assessment will differ from the corresponding ex post one. But here 
we have a deep fall in value creation that deserves to be explained. Let us move on 
contractual liabilities. 
 
Ex ante      interest   +   principal    =    60  +   150   =  210 
Ex post      interest   +   principal    =    60  +   150   =  210 
 
To start with, cash flows from assets are only half the level of due contractual liabilities. 
Moreover, when we shift our analysis to cash flows distribution on behalf of stockholders, 
we bump into a far-reaching discrepancy: 
 
Ex ante      dividends    =    200 
Ex post      dividends    =    400 
 
Dividends have doubled the amount predicted at the onset of the horizon, and the Board 
has to give reasons for such increase in dividends while the company was facing a deep 
fall in cash flows from assets.   
 
Cash flows to creditors and stockholders 
 
So far, the analysis has unveiled that something may be wrong within the company’s 
governance. In search of better understanding, let us take a look at new funding needs: 
 
Ex ante    new debt issue  +   new stock issue    =    300   +   154   =  354   27
Ex post    new debt issue  +   new stock issue    =    700  +   154   =  854 
 
This is a rather amazing outcome. While stock issue does not show any change at all, the 
new debt has more than doubled the ex ante value. It seems worthy of being checked 
whether  any  unexpected  investment  decision  may  throw  light  on  such  a  huge  gap 
between ex ante and ex post debt levels. 
 
Ex ante  non-current financial assets  +  fixed assets    =   100  +  100   =  200 
Ex post  non-current financial assets  +  fixed assets    =   500  +  200   =  700 
 
The comparison uncovers the fact that almost half as much of the new debt has been 
channeled to non-current financial assets or, still worse, cash flows from operations might 
have  been  diverted  into  a  window-dressing  exercise.    In  the  latter  setting,  instead  of 
financing  a  new  investment  project,  managers  would  have  been  pursuing  a  liquidity 
hedge-fund. Last of all, let us examine what happened with debt and stock repurchases. 
 
Ex ante    debt repurchase  +  stock repurchase   =   150  +  295   =  445 
Ex post    debt repurchase  +  stock repurchase   =   150  +  200   =  350 
 
The preliminary report, in stage 4, had already posted a warning about the unusual level 
of repurchase made available under the guise of new debt and stock issuance. Albeit the 
level  has  fallen  down,  the  actual  figure  is  three  times  the  amount  of  expected  value 
creation. 
 
Critical analysis of the risk position 
 
a)  Value  creation  plummeted  far  below  the  expected  level,  not  only  because 
income  has  been  lower,  but  mainly  on  the  grounds  of  heavy  non-productive 
provisions for non-current financial assets.   28
b) A second, but related problem is that repurchase of debt and stock tripled cash 
flows from assets, whereas the whole operation has been financed with new debt 
and stock placements.  





An arguable and failing performance brings upon serious concerns about the governance 
of this company. On the other hand, it also raises burning questions about the Board and 




For any organization, its governance entails risks stemming from its own nature. In point 
of fact, governance lies on a set of categories of analysis that can be mapped onto time-
scaled variables that foster risk-positions.  
 
In  this  paper,  we  have  learnt  how  to  measure  governance  risks  by  means  of  the 
incremental  cash-flow  model.  Along  any  planning  horizon  there  evolves  a  joint 
development between the time-scaled governance variables and incremental cash flows.  
 
A  common  thread  runs  through  the  governance  structure  and  the  human  agency  of 
incremental cash flows, from which governance risks may compound at the end of the 
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